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LOCKHART v. FRETWELL
113 S.Ct. 838 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In August 1985, an Arkansas jury convicted Bobby Ray Fretwell of
capital felony murder occurring during a robbery. Fretwell and two
accomplices decided to steal a truck parked outside a house. Fretwell
knocked on the door ofthe house and, when the victim answered the door,
Fretwell took his money and the key to the truck. Fretwell then shot the
victim in the temple, left him to die, and took the truck.
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence for two
aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain,
and (2) the murder was committed to facilitate Fretwell's escape.
Fretwell testified on his own behalf, along with a psychologist. No other
mitigating evidence was presented. The jury found the existence of the
first aggravating factor, that the murder was committed for pecuniary
gain, but not the second aggravating factor of facilitating escape. After
finding no mitigating factors, the jury sentenced Fretwell to death.
On direct appeal, Fretwell argued, interalia,that his death sentence
should be overturned in light of Collins v. Lockhart.1 In Collins, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had held a death sentence to be
unconstitutional if it was based upon an aggravating factor that duplicated an element of the underlying felony. Fretwell argued that because
the only aggravating factor found by the jury-that the murder was
committed for pecuniary gain-duplicated the underlying felony of
murder in the course of a robbery, his death sentence was unconstitutional under Collins. The Arkansas Supreme Court declined to consider
the argument because no objection was made to use of the aggravating
2
factor during the sentencing phase.
Fretwell filed a state habeas corpus petition, arguing that his counsel
had been ineffective for failing to raise a Collins objection at trial. The
Arkansas Supreme Court again rejected the claim, this time citing the
failure of the Arkansas courts to pass on the merits ofthe Collins question
3
at the time of Fretwell's trial.
Fretwell then filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging, inter
alia, ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise a Collins
objection. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas held that counsel had a duty to be aware of all law relevant to
capital cases and that failure to raise the Collins objection during the
sentencing phase amounted to prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. 4 The district court granted Fretwell's petition and conditionally
5
vacated the death sentence.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court by a
divided vote, 6 even though in 1989 it had overturned its decision in
Collins.7 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that if trial counsel had made the

1 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
2 Fretwell v. State, 708 S.W.2d 630 (Ark. 1986).
3 Fretwell v. State, 728 S.W.2d 180, 181 (Ark. 1987).
4 Fretvell v. Lockhart, 739 F.Supp. 1334, 1337 (E.D. Ark. 1990).
In Strickland,466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two
prong test to determine ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a
defendant must demonstrate that "counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. Second, a defendant
must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 694.
5 Fretwell, 739 F.Supp. at 1337.
6 Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1991).

Collinsobjection during the sentencing phase, the trial court would have
sustained the objection. Therefore, the jury would not have considered
the aggravating factor upon which they ultimately based their verdict of
death, and Fretwell would have been sentenced to life. In addition, the
Eighth Circuit found that Fretwell should be entitled to benefit from the
law in effect at the time of the original sentencing proceeding. 8
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, finding that Fretwell
had failed to satisfy the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of
counsel. 9 The Court ruled that Fretwell had failed to demonstrate any
prejudice as a result of his attorney's failure to raise a Collins objection
during the sentencing phase.10
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court focused on the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel as primarily a
protection of a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. Pointing out
that the Strickland test reflects this concern for fairness and reliability in
the trial process, Rehnquist reasoned that "an analysis focusing solely on
mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of
the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective." 1 I
Because the Eighth Circuit had overturned its Collins decision in 1989,
Rehnquist found that the result of Fretwell's trial was neither unfair nor
unreliable: "Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or
12
procedural right to which the law entitles him."
Under Rehnquist's interpretation, a defendant's rights under a
Strickland claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will be evaluated
under the law existing at the time the claim is heard, not under the law in
existence at the time of the alleged errors. In a strongly worded dissent,
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, pointed out the inconsistency of the majority's position with the Court's retroactivity ruling in
Teague v. Lane. 13 Justice Stevens reasoned:
If, under Teague, a defendant may not take advantage of
subsequent changes in the law when they are favorable to him,
then there is no self-evident reason why a State shot
able
to take advantage of subsequent changes in the law when they
are adverse to his interests.

7 See Perryv. Lockhart,871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir.), cert.denied, 493
U.S. 959 (1989). The Eighth Circuit overruled Collins because an
ensuing Supreme Court opinion, Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231
(1988), had undermined the reasoning of Collins.
8 Fretwell,946 F.2d at 578.
9 Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S.Ct. 838, 841 (1993).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 842.
12 Id. at 844.
13 489 U.S. 288 (1989). In Teague, the Court held that"'new rules'
... should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review." A
case is deemed to announce a new rule "if the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final."
Id. at 301.
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A rule that generally precludes defendants from taking advantage of post-conviction changes in the law, but allows the State
with this Court's duty to adminto do so, cannot be reconciled
14
ister justice impartially.
Justice Stevens also pointed to an apparent change in the Court's
application of the Strickland standards for an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim: "Strickland makes clear that the merits of an ineffective
15
assistance claim mustbe'viewed as of the time ofcounsel's conduct."'
Stevens argued that this standard should apply to the prejudice prong, as
well as to the quality of counsel's performance: "By defining prejudice
in terms of the effect of counsel's errors on the outcome of the proceedings, based on the 'totality of the evidence before the judge or jury,' the
Strickland Court establishes its point of reference firmly at the time of
6
trial or sentencing."t
In contrast, the majority opinion maintained that the requirement
that counsel's conduct be assessed based at the time of trial did not apply

14 Lockhart, 113 S.Ct. at 852-853 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 849 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
16 Lockhart, 113 S.Ct. at 849 (quoting Strickland,466 U.S. at 695
(citation omitted)). Justice Stevens also found that Fretwell's attorney
had so fundamentally failed the first prong of the Strickland test that
Fretwell might be entitled to relief even if he could not show prejudice
under the second prong:
The fact that counsel's performance constituted an abject
failure to address the most important legal question at issue in

to the prejudice prong because "[prejudice] focuses on the question
whether counsel's deficient performance renders the results of the trial
unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair."' 17 If an open
question previously existed as to the timing of the prejudice analysis
under Strickland, the majority opinion makes it clear that it is the law
existing at the time of review that is to be considered in determining
prejudice.
Now that prejudice under a Stricklandclaim is analyzed in light of
changes in the law beneficial only to the State, the need for timely
objection at trial is all the more important. After Fretwell, even failure
to raise a claim that clearly constituted attorney incompetence may not
result in relief if the law changes unfavorably. When added to the major
hurdle of the Teague retroactivity rule, the Court has built an effective
roadblock to capital defendants seeking habeas relief.
Summary and Analysis By:
Susan F. Henderson

his client's death penalty hearing gives rise, without more, to
apowerful presumption of breakdown in the entire adversarial
system.... In other words, there may be exceptional cases in
which counsel's performance falls so grievously far below
acceptable standards under Strickland's first prong that it
functions as the equivalent of an actual conflict of interest,
generating a presumption of prejudice and automatic reversal.
Id. at 851.
17 Id. at 844.

GRAHAM v. COLLINS
113 S.Ct. 892 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On May 13, 1981, Gary Graham shot Bobby Grant Lambert to
death in the parking lot of a Houston grocery store during the course
of a robbery. At trial Graham's mistaken identity defense failed and
he was convicted of capital murder. At the sentencing phase, after the
state presented evidence that Lambert's murder began a week during
which Graham committed a series of violent crimes, Graham attempted to put on evidence in mitigation of his general good character

I The Texas capital-sentencing statute at the time of Graham's
trial required the jury to consider:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death
of the deceased was committed deliberately and with reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased would occur;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence
whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased
was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.

traits, his relative youth, and a positive employment history. Applying
the "special questions" scheme of the Texas capital-sentencing statute, 1 the jury sentenced Graham to death. After the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence and the state courts rejected
Graham's attempts at post-conviction relief, Graham petitioned in
federal district court for habeas corpus relief arguing that ajury could
not give proper consideration to his mitigating evidence within the
confines of the Texas special issues scheme. The district court and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Graham's petition for

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 37.071 (b) (Vernon 1981). In order for
the death sentence to be imposed the jury was required to unanimously
answer all three questions in the affirmative.
The Texas legislature amended the death penalty statute in 1991
in response to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). The current law
instructs the jury that "it shall consider all evidence ... including
evidence of the defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the offense which militates for or mitigates against the
imposition of the death penalty." Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art.
37.071(d)(1) (Vernon 1993).

